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  I investigate the impact of liquidity on market efficiency using data from short-horizon 
binary outcome securities traded on an online exchange. I show that the most liquid securities 
markets exhibit significant pricing anomalies, such as overpricing low probability events and 
underpricing high probability events, whereas less liquid markets do not exhibit these anomalies. 
I also find that the prices of illiquid securities converge more quickly toward their terminal cash 
flows. These results are consistent with the idea that liquidity is a proxy for non-informational or 
noise trading, which can impede market efficiency; but they are inconsistent with models in 
which increases in liquidity have no impact or a favorable impact on efficiency. 
   2
I. Introduction 
 
Numerous theoretical arguments and mounting empirical evidence suggest that 
securities market liquidity is related to informational efficiency. One view is that 
illiquidity represents a transaction cost for informed arbitrageurs whose trades make 
prices more efficient. For example, when liquidity increases in Kyle’s (1985) model, 
informed traders bet more aggressively based on their existing information because their 
trades have a smaller impact on prices. In addition, informed traders have greater 
incentives to acquire more precise information in liquid markets. If informed arbitrageurs 
are less active in illiquid markets where trading is expensive, securities’ prices in these 
markets may deviate by large amounts from their fundamental values. Many recent 
papers provide indirect empirical support for the view that securities mispricing is greater 
in illiquid markets—e.g., Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), Kumar and Lee (2006), 
Sadka and Scherbina (2006), and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2006). 
An alternative view is that liquidity is a proxy for non-informational trading, 
referred to as noise trading hereafter, which may harm informational efficiency.
1 In 
behavioral finance models, various limits to arbitrage prevent rational agents from 
making aggressive bets against noise traders. For example, in DeLong, Shleifer, 
Summers, and Waldmann (1990b), rational arbitrageurs may reinforce demand shocks 
from noise traders because they anticipate mispricing will worsen in the short-run.
2 If 
                                                 
1 Variations in liquidity correspond to variations in noise trading in Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985), but they may also result from variations in the search costs that buyers and sellers incur in their 
efforts to transact—e.g., Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005). 
2 Another notable example is DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a). In that model, 
risk-averse arbitrageurs attenuate their demands because they must liquidate their positions at uncertain 
prices that are set, in part, by noise traders.   3
liquid markets have more noise trading than illiquid markets and rational agents do not 
fully offset noise traders’ demands, then securities prices in liquid markets may be 
inefficient relative to prices in illiquid markets. 
I test these competing predictions in a real-world setting that allows particularly 
clean tests of whether liquidity affects market efficiency. Specifically, I use data from 
Arrow-Debreu securities that represent bets on one-day sports and financial events traded 
on an online exchange, TradeSports.com. These securities possess many advantages for 
measuring absolute pricing efficiency relative to wagering markets, experimental 
markets, and conventional financial markets. 
Unlike trading in many wagering markets, trading on the TradeSports exchange 
takes place in standard continuous double auctions, comparable to the mechanisms used 
in the world’s major stock, currency, commodity and derivatives exchanges.
3 Unlike the 
participants in most experimental markets, many professional traders from Chicago, 
London, and New York routinely wager thousands of dollars in sports and financial 
markets on TradeSports. However, unlike securities in conventional financial markets, 
the TradeSports securities pay a single terminal cash flow at the end of their extremely 
short horizons, allowing me to directly observe and measure securities’ fundamentals 
(Thaler and Ziemba (1988)).
4 Equally important, most TradeSports securities are exposed 
to little or no systematic risk, making it straightforward to price these securities. For these 
                                                 
3 In both theory and practice, double auctions appear to be particularly robust mechanisms that promote 
rapid adjustment towards market equilibrium even in the presence of market frictions and trader 
irrationality. For theoretical models, see Gjerstad and Dickhaut (1998) and Satterthwaite and Williams 
(2002). For empirical evidence, see Gode and Sunder (1993), Friedman and Ostroy (1995), Cason and 
Friedman (1996), and Noussair et al. (1998). 
4 Accordingly, this paper’s tests of absolute pricing efficiency are not directly comparable to efficiency 
tests in traditional equity markets. For example, Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2006) argue that 
liquidity increases market efficiency based on evidence from high-frequency return predictability tests. 
Because their efficiency tests do not employ measures of stocks’ fundamentals, one cannot infer whether 
liquidity increases or decreases absolute pricing efficiency.   4
reasons, tests of efficiency using TradeSports data nicely complement the evidence from 
wagering markets, experimental markets, and conventional financial markets. 
To measure the liquidity of securities markets on the TradeSports exchange, I rely 
on two indicators designed to capture O’Hara’s (1995) definition of liquid markets: 
“those that accommodate trading with the least effect on price” (page 216). She suggests 
two measures that exemplify the cross-sectional dimension and time series dimension of 
liquidity from the perspective of an individual trader: low bid-ask spreads and low price 
movements after trading, respectively. The idea is that, in a liquid market, traders can 
cheaply conduct round-trip trades at a given time, and can do so almost continuously. 
Using both the cross-sectional and time series measures of liquidity, I show that 
more liquid securities markets on TradeSports exhibit significant pricing anomalies, 
whereas less liquid securities markets do not exhibit these anomalies. In liquid markets, 
low probability events are overpriced and high probability events are underpriced. This 
specific mispricing pattern is consistent with Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) theory of 
individual probability misperception, suggesting that their theory applies to traders who 
are active in liquid markets. 
To interpret this result further, I test two additional implications of the reasoning 
that liquidity could impede efficiency. First, if liquidity does represent noise trading, then 
the degree of mispricing in liquid markets will depend on arbitrageurs’ incentives to 
offset noise traders’ demands. A key factor in whether arbitrageurs will bet on 
fundamental information is whether they expect to be able to liquidate their positions 
before a security expires. In markets that are persistently liquid, arbitrageurs may 
destabilize prices because they can liquidate their positions before expiration at prices   5
that may differ from fundamentals. By contrast, in sporadically liquid markets, 
arbitrageurs cannot reliably liquidate their positions until securities yield their terminal 
cash flows and prices equal fundamentals. Consistent with these incentives for 
arbitrageurs, I show that markets with persistently high liquidity in consecutive time 
periods exhibit substantially greater mispricing than those with currently high, but 
sporadic, liquidity. 
Second, I explore whether liquidity (illiquidity) serves as a proxy for noise 
(informed) trading, as it does in Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). As I 
explain later, if periods of illiquidity tend to precede the release of information about 
securities’ fundamental values and its incorporation into prices, then illiquidity (liquidity) 
could represent informed (noise) trading. Indeed, I find strong empirical support for the 
hypothesis that the prices of illiquid securities converge more quickly toward their 
terminal cash flows. 
Collectively, these results suggest that liquidity is a proxy for noise trading, which 
can harm informational efficiency, particularly in persistently liquid markets.
5 The 
findings are consistent with theoretical models in which rational agents face limits to 
arbitrage, but inconsistent with models in which increases in liquidity have no impact or a 
favorable impact on efficiency. Although related work identifies similar pricing patterns 
in wagering markets (e.g., Jullien and Selanie (2000), Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), and 
Zitzewitz (2006)) and financial markets (Rubinstein (1985), Brav and Heaton (1996), and 
Barberis and Huang (2005)), none of these studies draws a link between securities 
mispricing and market liquidity. The main contribution of this paper is to show that the 
                                                 
5 These findings are consistent with evidence from experimental markets in Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar 
(2006). The authors show that laboratory markets are less efficient when noise traders are more active.   6
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) pattern in securities mispricing is largely confined to 
liquid markets, and does not apply to illiquid markets. 
  The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section II, I describe the structure of the 
securities data from the TradeSports exchange and the measures of liquidity used 
throughout the paper. In Section III, I perform the initial efficiency tests for liquid and 
illiquid securities markets. In Section IV.A, I examine whether mispricing is greater for 
persistently liquid securities; in Section IV.B, I explore whether illiquidity is related to 
the incorporation of information about securities’ terminal cash flows into prices. In 
Section V, I conclude and suggest directions for further research on liquidity and 
securities market efficiency. 
 
II. Securities Data and Measures of Liquidity 
 
I construct an automatic data retrieval program to collect comprehensive statistics 
about each security traded on the TradeSports exchange.
6 The program runs at 30-minute 
intervals almost continuously from March 17, 2003 to October 23, 2006.
7 All empirical 
tests in this paper include only data from the one-day sports and financial securities 
recorded by the program. The vast majority of TradeSports’ securities are based on one-
day sports or financial events, such whether the Yankees will win a particular baseball 
game or whether the Dow Jones Index will close 50 or more points above the previous 
                                                 
6 I am grateful to TradeSports Exchange Limited for granting me permission to run this program. 
7 The program’s 30-minute interval is approximate because it records securities sequentially, implying that 
the exact time interval depends on whether new securities have been added or subtracted and precise 
download speeds. In practice, these factors rarely affect the time interval by more than a few minutes. The 
program stops running only for random author-specific events, such as software installations, operating 
system updates, power failures, office relocation—and technical TradeSports issues, such as daily server 
maintenance and occasional changes in the web site’s HTML code.   7
day’s close. I focus on these securities to limit the number of factors needed as controls in 
the statistical analysis that follows.
8 Roughly 70% of TradeSports’ securities are based on 
sports events, 25% are based on financial events and fewer than 5% are based on events 
in all other categories combined—e.g., political, entertainment, legal, weather, and 
miscellaneous. 
The TradeSports exchange solely facilitates the trading of binary outcome 
securities by its members, and does not conduct transactions for its own account.
9 
Securities owners receive $10 if a pre-specified, verifiable event occurs and $0 
otherwise—e.g., the owner of the Dow Jones security mentioned above receives $10 if 
and only if the index goes up by 50 points or more. For ease of interpretation, the 
exchange divides its security prices into 100 points, worth $0.10 per point. The minimum 
price increment, or tick size, ranges between one point for thinly traded securities and 0.1 
point for heavily traded securities. 
TradeSports levies a commission equal to 0.4% of the maximum securities price 
($10) on a per security basis whenever a security is bought or sold.
10 At the time of 
security expiration, traders must liquidate all outstanding securities positions and incur 
commissions.
11 Note that the $0.08 round-trip transaction fee is smaller than the value of 
                                                 
8 For sports events, I consider only securities with an official TradeSports categorization that includes 
either the text “game,” “bout,” or “match”; for financial events, I consider only securities that do not 
include “weekly,” “monthly,” or “yearly.” Over 96% and 99.6% of qualifying financial securities expire on 
the day of or the day after listing, respectively. Over 97% of all the eligible financial securities are based on 
the level of daily financial indices. Even though virtually all of the uncertainty for qualifying sports and 
financial events is resolved on the day in which the security expires, some securities are listed and traded 
on the exchange before the expiration day. I keep all observations within one week of the expiration day. 
9 TradeSports limits the risk that the counterparty in a security transaction will default by imposing 
stringent margin requirements for each sale or purchase of a security by one of its members. In most cases, 
members must retain sufficient funds in their TradeSports account to guard against the maximum possible 
loss on a transaction. TradeSports also settles and clears all transactions conducted on its exchange. 
10 The exchange has recently eliminated commissions for non-marketable limit orders. 
11 Expiration is the time at which the payoff event is verifiable and the owner receives payment.   8
one point ($0.10) for most securities. This implies arbitrageurs have an incentive to push 
prices back towards fundamental values if they stray by even one point. 
Following conventions in other studies of financial markets, I eliminate 
observations from the least active markets on the TradeSports exchange, where few 
traders participate and price data are of poor quality. Specifically, I exclude observations 
on securities with a cumulative trading volume below 50 securities ($500), market depth 
below 10 securities ($100), or bid-ask spreads exceeding 10% ($1.00).
12 I compute 
market depth as the sum of all outstanding buy and sell limit orders within the maximum 
10% bid-ask spread. These restrictions are designed to exclude securities without well-
established market prices for which tests of efficiency are unlikely to be meaningful. 
  I use two measures of securities market liquidity to capture its cross-sectional and 
time series dimensions. I define cross-sectional liquidity as the ability to cheaply conduct 
a round-trip trade at a given time, and time series liquidity as the ability to trade almost 
continuously at prices that do not change very much. To maximize the power of the 
statistical tests that follow, I partition all securities into two equal-sized halves based on 
the amount of liquidity according to each of these two measures.
13 
The cross-sectional indicator for the amount of market liquidity is a low bid-ask 
spread. Following convention, I define the spread as the difference between the inside 
(lowest) ask and (highest) bid quotations. I consider all securities markets with spreads 
below the median, usually around $0.20, to have “low spreads” and all other securities to 
                                                 
12 The observations excluded by the combination of all three restrictions represent only 10% of volume on 
the exchange. Using more stringent market activity criteria tends to strengthen the statistical results below. 
13 Other partitions, such as quartiles based on the amount of liquidity, produce similar results.   9
have “high spreads.”
14 To avoid any look-ahead bias in the partition cutoff value, I use 
the median spread from the distribution of all qualifying observations on TradeSports 
securities over the prior six calendar months. 
The time series indicator of market liquidity is based on the absolute deviation 
between the bid-ask midpoint and the previous transaction price, which I call post-trade 
price movement. I infer that securities markets with large post-trade price movements are 
costly to trade, or illiquid. In these markets, a buyer or seller cannot repeatedly trade at 
the same price, which represents a transaction cost. For example, suppose that the last 
trade price is 66 points and the current bid and ask quotations are 67 and 69 points, 
implying the midpoint is 68 points. If the last trade was buyer-initiated and the next trade 
will execute at the bid-ask midpoint, the same buyer would have to pay two points more 
(68 minus 66) for the security. Thus, high post-trade price movement can be viewed as a 
proxy for high price impact and illiquidity. I categorize all trades with below-median 
post-trade price movement, usually around $0.10, as “low-impact” securities and all 
others as “high-impact” securities. I use the median post-trade price movement from all 
TradeSports securities over the past six months as the cutoff value. 
  One would hope that two different measures designed to capture the same 
liquidity phenomenon would exhibit some degree of similarity. Indeed, I find that the 
correlation between the logarithms of bid-ask spread and post-trade price movement is 
over 60%, which is strongly statistically significant at any level.
15 This is comforting in 
                                                 
14 In the first six months of data, I use the median of all spreads in the sample to date. In general, using the 
median spread from the previous six months as the cutoff does not divide securities into two groups of 
identical size because of lumpiness in the distribution of spreads. Using ad hoc spread cutoffs of $0.10, 
$0.20 and $0.30 produces qualitatively similar results. 
15 I compute the logarithms of post-trade price movement and spreads to reduce the substantial skewness in 
these measures before computing their correlation. Before taking logs, I add 0.1 to post-trade price 
movements. This allows me to use observations with zero post-trade price movement, and makes the   10
that the two measures, one cross-sectional and one time series, probably describe some 
common aspect of market activity.
16 
 
III. Tests of Market Efficiency 
 
  Now I analyze the absolute pricing efficiency of securities on the TradeSports 
exchange. I conduct these tests separately for the liquid securities, the illiquid securities, 
and all securities. I also analyze the efficiency of sports and financial markets separately 
based on the results in Tetlock (2004), which reports evidence that pricing in these 
markets differs significantly. Fortunately, the key results in this study apply to both sports 
securities and financial securities, regardless of their exposure to market risk.
17 
  Microstructure theory measures absolute pricing efficiency as the expected mean 
squared error of prices minus cash flows, which can be decomposed into two 
components. First, I focus on measuring the squared bias component of absolute pricing 
efficiency, as opposed to the conditional variance component. This emphasis is standard 
practice in the literature on market efficiency in binary prediction markets because 
expected cash flows are not directly observable for each security. Thus, researchers 
cannot measure securities’ conditional variances without making assumptions about 
biases, but they can estimate average biases by comparing securities’ average cash flows 
to their prices. In this section, I estimate biases in prices following conventions from prior 
                                                                                                                                                 
variable’s minimum value equal to the minimum spread of 0.1 point. The correlation between raw spreads 
and raw post-trade price movements is still greater than 45%. 
16 I find similar results using alternative measures based on the common component of cross-sectional and 
time series liquidity—e.g., linear combinations of bid-ask spreads and post-trade price movement. 
17 In unreported tests, I allow for the possibility that financial securities with positive exposure to market 
risk have different expected returns from those with negative risk. I find a positive, but insignificant, risk 
premium of less than 1% for the typical financial security with positive exposure to the market. This is not 
surprising because three years of data is usually insufficient for estimating market risk premiums.   11
work—e.g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2004), Tetlock (2004), and Zitzewitz (2006). In the 
subsequent section, I make additional assumptions in an effort to indirectly estimate the 
conditional variance component of mean squared error. 
I employ a straightforward regression methodology to test the null hypothesis that 
securities prices are unbiased predictors of securities’ cash flows. A single observation 
consists of a security’s current price and its returns until expiration. I measure all current 
prices using the midpoints of the inside bid and ask quotations to avoid the problem of 
bid-ask bounce that could affect transaction prices.
18 I calculate a security’s percentage 
returns to expiration by subtracting its current price from its expiration value, which is 
either 0 or 100 points, then dividing by 100 points.
19 The null hypothesis is that 
securities’ expected returns to expiration are zero, regardless of the current securities 
price. The alternative hypothesis is that Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) theory of 
probability perception describes the pattern of expected returns across securities with 
different current prices. 
The S-shaped form of the probability weighting function hypothesized in 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and formalized in Prelec (1998) informs my choice of 
pricing categories and statistical tests. The S-shape refers to a graph of subjective versus 
objective probabilities, as shown first in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Prelec (1998) 
derives their theory of probability misperception from axiomatic foundations. He predicts 
that agents overestimate the likelihood of events with objective probabilities less than 1/e 
= 36.79% and underestimate the likelihood of events with objective probabilities greater 
than 1/e. There is also an ample body of empirical evidence that is consistent with a 
                                                 
18 All results are robust to using the most recent transaction price instead. 
19 I exclude the very small fraction of TradeSports contracts that do not expire at 0 or 100 points. I divide 
by 100 points to represent the combined amount of capital that buyers and sellers invest in the security.   12
probability weighting function having a fixed point in the neighborhood of 1/e (Tversky 
and Kahneman (1992), Camerer and Ho (1994), and Wu and Gonzalez (1996)). 
Based on this evidence, I construct dummy variables, Price1 through Price5, for 
five equally-spaced pricing intervals: (0,20), [20,40), [40,60), [60,80), and [80,100) 
points. I then measure the returns until expiration for securities in each pricing category. I 
test the null hypothesis that all returns to expiration are equal to zero against the 
alternative that securities in the first two categories—Price1 and Price2—based on small 
probability events (p < 40%), are overpriced and securities in the last three categories—
Price3, Price4, and Price5—based on large probability events (p > 40%), are underpriced. 
I report the results from three Wald (1943) tests based on this simple idea. The 
first Wald test measures whether small probability events are overpriced on average:
20 
(1)  (Price1 + Price2) / 2 = 0   
The second Wald test assesses whether large probability events are underpriced: 
(2)  (Price3 + Price4 + Price5) / 3 = 0   
The third Wald test measures whether large probability events are more underpriced than 
small probability events—i.e., whether the mispricing function is S-shaped: 
(3)  (Price3 + Price4 + Price5) / 3 – (Price1 + Price2) / 2 = 0   
Of the three, this is the most powerful test of the null hypothesis against the Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) alternative because it accounts for other factors that could influence 
the level of mispricing of both small and large probability events.
21 
                                                 
20 Despite the specific nature of over- and underpricing predicted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), I use 
two-tailed Wald tests to be conservative. 
21 The choice of how to partition the pricing categories has little effect on the Wald tests because, 
regardless of the partitioning, these tests assess whether the returns to expiration of securities priced below 
40 points differ from the returns of securities priced above 40 points.   13
  I use standard ordinary least squares to estimate the coefficients of the five pricing 
categories. For all regression coefficients, I compute robust standard errors to account for 
the repeated sampling of the same security over multiple time periods and the sampling 
of different securities based on related events. I employ the clustering methodology 
developed by Froot (1989) to allow for correlations in the error terms of all securities 
expiring on the same calendar day, which simultaneously corrects for the repeated 
sampling of the same security and the sampling of related events.
22 This clustering 
procedure exploits the fact that all event uncertainty is resolved on the day of expiration 
(see footnote 8). 
  To illustrate the efficiency tests and give an overview of the data, I first examine 
the returns to expiration for all sports securities, all financial securities, and both groups 
together. Table I displays the regression coefficient estimates for Price1 through Price5 
along with the three Wald tests described above. The main result is that neither sports nor 
financial securities exhibit substantial mispricing, which is consistent with Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2004) and Tetlock (2004). 
  [Insert Table I around here.] 
The qualitative patterns in the pricing of both sets of securities and in their 
aggregate suggest, however, that the probability weighting function could play a role in 
any mispricing that does exist. To aid the reader in identifying the S-shaped pattern, 
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of mispricing in each pricing category for 
sports, financial, and both types of securities. 
[Insert Figure 1 around here.] 
                                                 
22 Using a finer clustering unit based on the expiration day and type of security does not affect the results.   14
The securities based on small probability sports events in pricing categories 1 and 
2 appear to be overpriced by 1.70 points (p-value = 0.063) and financial securities based 
on large probability events in categories 3, 4, and 5 are underpriced by 2.28 points 
(p-value = 0.024). The Wald test for the S-shaped pattern rejects the null hypothesis that 
returns do not differ across pricing categories at the 5% level for both sports and financial 
securities. Interestingly, the magnitude of mispricing decreases from an average of 2.55 
points across the sports and financial groups to just 1.69 points in the aggregate group, 
which is barely statistically significant at the 5% level. This reduction occurs because of 
differences in the pricing patterns of sports and financial securities and the changing 
relative composition of sports and financial securities within pricing categories.
23 
  Having established that both sports and financial securities show a limited degree 
of inefficiency, I now turn to the key test of whether the S-shaped Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) pattern is more pronounced in the illiquid or liquid securities. Table II 
and Table III each report the results from nine regressions that attempt to address this 
question using the cross-sectional and time series measures of liquidity. Each table 
includes separate regression results for sports, financial and both types of securities 
sorted by their degree of liquidity. The tests for differences in the coefficients (Columns 
Three, Six, and Nine) come from joint regressions in which I estimate coefficients on 
Price1 through Price5 for both liquid and illiquid securities simultaneously by adding five 
interaction terms—between liquidity and Price1 through Price5. 
  [Insert Table II around here.] 
                                                 
23 The disparity between the average of the individual estimates and the aggregate estimate illustrates the 
importance of estimating the effects on sports and financial securities separately.   15
  Table II reports the returns to expiration of various securities sorted by whether 
their bid-ask spreads fall below the median spread on the TradeSports exchange during 
the previous six-month period. For both sports and financial securities, the S-shaped 
probability weighting function pattern is strongly statistically and economically 
significant only in the securities with high cross-sectional liquidity. For example, the 
S-shaped pattern is virtually nonexistent in the illiquid sports securities (0.75 points), but 
is quite pronounced in the liquid sports securities (4.60 points, p-value = 0.004). 
Similarly, the S-shaped pattern is small in the illiquid financial securities (2.27 points), 
but strongly significant and large in the liquid financial securities (6.11 points, p-value = 
0.001). Moreover, both of the two tests for whether the S-shaped patterns are more 
pronounced in the liquid securities than in the illiquid securities reject the null hypothesis 
at the 5% level. Again, the rejection of the null hypothesis is slightly weaker for the 
aggregate of sports and financial securities, but still significant at the 5% level. 
Note that the signs of 17 of the 20 individual coefficients on the liquid securities 
and interaction terms in the sports and financial security regressions agree with the 
predictions of the S-shaped probability weighting function. This precise pattern in 
mispricing is highly unlikely to occur by chance (p-value = 0.001). Indeed, the qualitative 
pattern in the coefficients explains why, even though only a few of the individual 
coefficients on the pricing category dummy variables are statistically significant, the 
Wald tests for the S-shape easily reject the null hypothesis of zero expected returns. 
The effect of liquidity on the magnitude of the S-shaped pattern is similar for 
sports and financial securities (3.85 points and 3.84 points). Using the same bid-ask 
spread or price impact cutoff values for both types of securities, however, I find that a   16
much greater fraction of the sports securities fall into the high liquidity classification 
(more than 50%) relative to the financial securities (fewer than 20%), regardless of the 
liquidity measure.
24 One interpretation is that liquidity is a proxy for non-informational or 
noise trading, which is more widespread in sports securities. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between liquidity and market efficiency is similar for both security types. 
  Table III shows the same analysis in Table II for securities sorted by their degree 
of time series liquidity. Specifically, Table III reports the returns to expiration for each of 
the five pricing categories for securities sorted by whether their post-trade price 
movement falls below the median post-trade price movement on the exchange during the 
previous six-month period. Columns One and Four establish that the liquid (low post-
trade price movement) sports and financial securities have returns to expiration that 
exhibit a strong S-shaped pattern across pricing categories of roughly five points. By 
contrast, Columns Two and Five show that the illiquid (high post-trade price movement) 
securities exhibit at most weak evidence of an S-shaped pattern. Again, for both sports 
and financial securities, the S-shaped pattern is much larger in liquid securities—by 
magnitudes of 4.61 points and 2.98 points, respectively, both significant at the 1% level. 
  [Insert Table III around here.] 
Figure 2 graphically represents the difference in returns to expiration for the 
illiquid and liquid sports and financial securities in each of the five pricing categories 
from Columns Three and Six of Table II and Table III. The figure shows the interaction 
terms from the regressions in these tables, which separately measure the effect of the two 
liquidity measures on mispricing. The vertical axis shows the returns to expiration for 
each security grouping while the horizontal axis shows the pricing categories. The visual 
                                                 
24 Some disparity in these fractions is inevitable because I use the same cutoff value for both security types.   17
impression from the figure confirms the statistical results in Table II and Table III: the 
differences in returns to expiration for both security types show distinct S-shaped 
patterns. 
  [Insert Figure 2 around here.] 
In the liquid securities, the overpricing of low probability events is much larger, 
especially in sports securities, and the underpricing of high probability events is far more 
severe, especially in financial securities. The differences between the pricing category 
coefficients have the sign predicted by the S-shaped pattern in 18 out of 20 cases, which 
is virtually impossible to occur by chance (p-value < 0.001). This visual and intuitive 
evidence is consistent with the numerical impression from the tables. If one accepts 
market liquidity as an adequate proxy for noise trading, these results suggest that noise 
traders cause significant harm to pricing efficiency in exactly the manner predicted by the 
classic S-shaped probability weighting function. 
It is important to recognize that the findings summarized in Figure 2 are distinct 
from the well-known empirical relationships between liquidity risk and expected returns 
in traditional financial markets (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)). On the TradeSports 
exchange, there is little room for interpreting the expected returns on liquid securities as 
compensation for risk because the sports securities exhibit the same pattern as the 
financial securities even though they are not susceptible to systematic risks. In fact, the 
evidence here suggests a logical alternative to risk-based explanations: the expected 
returns in liquid securities could be attributable to the probability misperceptions of the 
agents who are most active in liquid markets.   18
  Next, I evaluate the possibility that other security characteristics, such as return 
volatility, trading volume, order imbalance, and time horizon, could explain the 
relationship between mispricing and liquidity. I measure these effects using 20 (4x5) 
interaction terms between each of the four control variables and the five pricing category 
dummy variables. This estimation procedure is directly analogous to the procedure used 
to measure the effect of liquidity on efficiency. It also allows me to use the same Wald 
tests described in Equations (1) through (3) to assess whether volatility, volume, order 
imbalance, or time horizon effects could explain the S-shaped mispricing pattern. 
To implement the Wald tests for the control variables, I convert volatility, 
volume, order imbalances, and time horizon into dummy variables before generating the 
necessary interaction terms. Analogous to the procedure used to generate the liquidity 
dummies, I partition all observations into two equal-sized halves based on market depth 
to generate dummies for above-median values of each control variable, using rolling six-
month windows to compute the medians. The full-sample median value cutoffs for the 
first three control variables are: 0.5 points ($0.05) per 30 minutes for the volatility 
dummy, 213 securities ($2,130) for the volume dummy, and 4.47% of market depth for 
the order imbalance dummy.
25 To capture the effect of information arrival, I create a time 
horizon dummy that is equal to one if the observation occurs before the event begins.
26 
The regression coefficients in Columns One, Two, and Three in Table IV reveal 
that the effect of liquidity on pricing efficiency is not particularly sensitive to the 
                                                 
25 Imposing ad hoc full-sample cutoffs for volume, volatility, and order imbalance produces similar results. 
26 Because I do not know precisely when each event begins, I assume that the event is in progress once the 
securities price has moved by a “significant” amount, five or more points, relative to the first trading price. 
I use this definition for the time horizon dummy to avoid any potential look-ahead bias in knowing when 
the event will end. I find similar results for alternative definitions of the time horizon dummy.   19
inclusion of additional interaction terms.
27 Columns Two and Three report regression 
results using bid-ask spreads and post-trade price movement as the liquidity measures. 
Column One uses a liquidity dummy equal to one for securities with both cross-sectional 
and time series liquidity above their respective median values. The estimates from all 
three columns show that the S-shaped mispricing pattern changes very little when I allow 
for the possibility that volatility, volume, order imbalances, and time horizon affect 
mispricing. The magnitude of the S-shape remains roughly three or four points and is 
statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level, depending on the liquidity measure used. 
[Insert Table IV around here.] 
Rather than report the individual coefficients, I summarize the results from the 
Wald tests based on the 20 coefficient estimates of the control variable interaction terms 
in Table IV. I cannot reject the null hypothesis for the joint significance of the 20 control 
variables at even the 10% level. None of the four sets of control variable interactions 
exerts a significant effect on mispricing at the 5% level. None of the four sets of 
coefficients shows the same S-shaped pattern as the liquidity coefficients—i.e., no 
estimate is statistically significant and the largest absolute value is less than two points. 
Overall, the inclusion of the controls based on volatility, volume, order imbalance, and 
time horizon appears to introduce estimation error without increasing the regression’s 
explanatory power. Proponents of market efficiency can take comfort in the fact that few 
variables, other than liquidity and price, are useful predictors of returns to expiration. 
 
                                                 
27 Rather than run separate regressions for sports and financial securities, to conserve space, I include five 
interaction terms that account for differences in mispricing across the two types.   20
IV. Interpreting Mispricing and Liquidity 
 
  In this section, I examine whether certain types of liquid securities exhibit greater 
mispricing, and explore the nature of liquidity on the TradeSports exchange. Both sets of 
tests shed light on the hypothesis that liquidity is a proxy for noise trading, which 
adversely affects market efficiency. 
 
IV.A Variation in Mispricing within Liquid Securities 
 
  In the first set of tests, I analyze how mispricing varies within the liquid securities 
identified in Section III. If liquidity does represent noise trading, then the extent to which 
informed arbitrageurs’ bet against noise traders will determine the degree of mispricing in 
liquid markets. I use two variables to measure informed traders’ ability or willingness to 
offset the demands of noise traders. 
First, I construct an indicator of persistent liquidity in consecutive time periods, 
which could reduce arbitrageurs’ incentives to trade on fundamental information. For 
example, theoretical models such as DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a 
and 1990b) suggest that informed traders are more reluctant to offset the demands of 
noise traders, and may even reinforce their demands, when there is a risk that mispricing 
will worsen in the short-run. Such increases in mispricing can only occur in securities 
with persistent liquidity, which is necessary for arbitrageurs to liquidate their positions at 
prices that may differ from securities’ fundamental values. I consider securities that 
qualify for the high liquidity classification in three consecutive data recording periods,   21
over one hour, to exhibit “persistent liquidity,” and all others to exhibit “sporadic 
liquidity.”
28 Because the high liquidity classification shows strong positive serial 
correlation, 43.9% of liquid securities meet the criterion for persistent liquidity.
29 
Second, I test whether arbitrageurs are more or less effective in counteracting 
mispricing in liquid securities with greater trading volume. One view is that arbitrageurs 
have greater incentives to offset mispricing in securities with greater transaction volumes. 
A competing view is that securities with high trading volume are likely to have more 
noise traders, whose demands are not fully offset by increased informed trading. To 
discriminate among these two hypotheses, I assess whether the degree of mispricing in 
liquid securities is related to trading volume. 
The regressions in Table V include estimates of the effect of persistent liquidity 
and high trading volume on mispricing in liquid securities. The most notable result is that 
securities with persistent high liquidity show significantly greater mispricing than 
securities with sporadically high liquidity. The test for whether the S-shaped pattern is 
equally pronounced in these two groups rejects the null hypothesis at the 1% level. This 
result suggests that persistent liquidity does correspond to the classic theoretical risk that 
mispricing could worsen in the short-run. This interpretation is that arbitrageurs do not 
offset, and may even reinforce, noise traders’ probability misperceptions in securities that 
exhibit persistent liquidity. However, arbitrage is quite effective in the securities with 
sporadically high liquidity, where mispricing is 73% smaller (2.59 points vs. 9.62 points). 
                                                 
28 The results are similar for alternative definitions of persistent liquidity, such as high liquidity in two or 
five periods in a row. Using cutoff values higher than five eliminates many events from the sample. In 
these events, trading activity lasts for only a few hours because the event itself lasts for only a few hours. 
29 Less than 0.2% of the persistently liquid securities are financial securities because high levels of liquidity 
are not persistent or common in financial securities. Using a less stringent criterion, I confirm that the 
qualitative results are similar for financial securities that exhibit relatively persistent liquidity.   22
In these securities, arbitrageurs effectively offset noise traders’ demands because they 
expect the security to yield a payoff equal to its fundamental value at expiration. 
  [Insert Table V around here.] 
Figure 3 visually compares the returns to expiration of securities with low 
liquidity, those with high but sporadic liquidity, and those with persistently high liquidity. 
The immediate impression from the figure is that the dark gray bars representing the 
mispricing of persistently liquid securities are very large relative to the mispricing bars 
for other securities. Comparing the white and the light gray mispricing bars, one sees that 
the S-shaped pattern is only slightly larger in securities with high but sporadic liquidity 
relative to securities with low liquidity (2.59 points vs. 1.09 points). That is, there is only 
slight mispricing in securities without persistent liquidity even when there is currently 
high liquidity. 
  [Insert Figure 3 around here.] 
  The second set of tests in Table V provides further insight into how mispricing 
varies within liquid securities. Columns Four, Five, and Six show that the liquid 
securities with greater trading volume are less efficiently priced, not more, than the liquid 
securities with lower trading volume. Although this effect is not as large or robust as the 
effect of persistent liquidity, it is surprising that arbitrage is less effective in high-volume, 
liquid securities where arbitrageurs would seem to have larger incentives to counteract 
mispricing. One possible resolution to this puzzle is that heavy trading in liquid securities 
is a proxy for large demands from noise traders, which arbitrageurs only partially offset.
30 
                                                 
30 In Table IV, I use trading volume as a control variable in regressions that include liquid and illiquid 
securities, finding that the overall effect of trading volume on mispricing is not large. Thus, the results in 
Table V show that trading volume primarily affects mispricing in liquid securities.   23
  As a final check on the magnitude and relevance of the mispricing in securities 
with high cross-sectional and time series liquidity, I explore the profitability of a simple 
trading strategy based on the pattern of mispricing identified in Column One of Table 
IV.
31 A natural trading strategy would be to sell all of the overpriced liquid securities in 
pricing categories 1 and 2, and buy all of the underpriced liquid securities in pricing 
categories 3, 4, and 5. I augment this simple rule to reflect the stylized fact that the 
overpricing of low probability events is more severe in sports securities. I also disregard 
the financial securities because these are few in number and could be susceptible to 
systematic risk. Thus, I analyze the trading strategy that sells liquid sports securities in 
pricing categories 1 and 2.
32 
  To make this trading strategy implementable, I assume that a trader submits a 
market order to TradeSports as soon as the automated data retrieval program records a 
price on the exchange. This means that all buy orders execute at the lowest asking price 
and all sell orders execute at the highest bid price at the time of retrieval. Unfortunately, 
the trader must bear a substantial liquidity cost, which he or she could possibly avoid by 
using a limit order.
33 In addition, I assume that the trader must incur the maximum 
round-trip commission on TradeSports, which is 0.8% per round-trip. This set of 
assumptions leads to a conservative estimate of realizable trading returns. 
Despite the substantial liquidity and commission costs of implementing the 
strategy, Table VI reports that selling the liquid sports securities in pricing categories 1 
and 2 yields realizable expected returns of 3.42% and 2.94% over the time span of a day 
                                                 
31 Obviously, one can improve upon this trading strategy using the information in Table V. 
32 A number of closely related trading strategies yield profits that are comparable in magnitude. 
33 Strategies using complex limit order rules may be profitable, but this is extremely difficult to evaluate 
because of the adverse selection problem associated with the execution of standing limit orders.   24
or so.
34 Table VI also shows that buying the liquid financial securities in pricing 
categories 3, 4, and 5 produces expected returns of 10.17%, 9.38% and -0.08%. Figure 4 
visually represents this evidence on returns to expiration for buyers and sellers of sports 
and financial securities. The expected returns in Table VI and Figure 4 are not weighted 
by the amount of capital that could be invested in each security and do not account for the 
cost of obtaining this capital. 
  [Insert Table VI around here.] 
  [Insert Figure 4 around here.] 
  I make three additional assumptions to address these issues and obtain a 
conservative estimate of the total dollar profits from the strategy that sells liquid sports 
securities in pricing categories 1 and 2. First, I assume that a retail investor could 
establish a line of credit allowing her to access capital at an annualized interest rate of 
10%, or 0.027% per day.
35 Second, to simplify strategy implementation, I consider a 
strategy based on short-selling only the liquid sports securities in pricing categories 1 and 
2 that expire on the same calendar day in which the data retrieval program records their 
prices.
36 Third, I assume that the investor submits a market sell order for the quantity of 
securities exactly equal to the size of the current inside bid quote. 
I find that this trading strategy earns an average of only $390 per day over the 
course of the 471 days in which it is implementable. Restated in more familiar terms, the 
strategy yields a total of $184,000 during the 1,109-day data sample, or $60,000 per year. 
Based on this analysis, there appears to be sufficient competition among arbitrageurs on 
                                                 
34 The vast majority of these securities expire within the same day. 
35 I assume that the investor pays a full day’s worth of interest for funds used less than 24 hours. 
36 To be conservative, I assume traders must post margin equal to the maximum possible loss in order to 
sell a security—e.g., a trader must post $8 to sell a security priced at $2 because it could expire at $10.   25
the TradeSports exchange to ensure that realizable trading profits do not become too 
large, which is consistent with endogenous information acquisition models—e.g., 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). A wage of $60,000 per year is a reasonable estimate of the 
equilibrium compensation for actively monitoring the securities on the exchange. 
 
IV.B Is Liquidity a Proxy for Noise Trading? 
 
  Although the previous tests provide indirect evidence that liquidity could serve as 
a proxy for non-informational or noise trading, I have not yet established a direct 
relationship between liquidity and informed or non-informational trading.  In this section, 
I attempt to infer the relative amount of informed trading by examining the behavior of 
prices following periods of liquidity and periods of illiquidity. If periods of illiquidity 
tend to precede the release of information about securities’ fundamental values and its 
incorporation into prices, I infer that illiquidity (liquidity) could represent informed 
(noise) trading. 
I measure the extent of information release during an event as the convergence of 
prices toward securities’ terminal payoffs at expiration—i.e., the reduction in the squared 
difference between prices and terminal payoffs. This measurement of information release 
requires two key assumptions. First, the degree of informed trading prior to an event must 
be a monotonic function of the amount of information released during and after the event. 
Second, I assume that reductions in mean squared error occur only from reduction in the 
conditional variance component—i.e., the squared bias component does not change. This 
may be a reasonable approximation for short time horizons, but the previous results   26
suggest this assumption will fail for long time horizons as squared bias approaches zero. 
Because liquid markets exhibit greater mispricing that is corrected over time, periods of 
liquidity will appear to precede greater information release even if there is no true 
relationship. This reasoning suggests my second assumption is conservative in the sense 
that it will be difficult to interpret liquidity as a proxy for non-informational or noise 
trading.  
Under the two assumptions above, a comparison of the reduction in mean squared 
error following periods of liquidity and periods of illiquidity reveals whether illiquidity 
(liquidity) is a plausible proxy for informed (noise) trading. If prices converge faster 
toward fundamentals after periods of illiquidity (liquidity), I infer that these periods are 
characterized by relatively more informed (noise) trading. I use a regression methodology 
to explore whether illiquidity precedes information release in the next data recording 
period, and a visual representation to show the evolution of information release in the ten 
data recording periods surrounding the time of liquidity measurement. 
Table VII displays two regression estimates of the effect of liquidity on the 
reduction in mean squared error over the next data recording period (roughly 30 minutes). 
There is one regression for each of the two measures of liquidity: the logarithm of bid-ask 
spread (LnSpread) and the logarithm of post-trade price movement (LnImpact). Each 
regression includes control variables for expected information release through expiration 
(ExpInfo), whether the event is in progress (InEvent), two measures for the time elapsed 
since initial security listing (LnTime and LnMoves), and the trading volume (LnVolHr)   27
and volatility (LnAbsRet) during the prior period.
37 To eliminate the influence of omitted 
factors that could affect information release and market-wide liquidity, all regressions 
also include time dummy variables for each data recording period. I report the coefficient 
estimates and standard errors based on the equal-weighted averages from monthly cross-
sectional regressions because these estimates are the most conservative (Fama and 
MacBeth (1973)).
38 The coefficient standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation up to three lags in the monthly time series of coefficients (Newey and 
West (1987)). 
[Insert Table VII around here.] 
For both liquidity measures, periods of illiquidity precede the release of 
information about securities’ terminal payoffs over the next 30 minutes or so. The 
coefficient estimates on the LnSpread and LnImpact illiquidity variables are extremely 
statistically robust—both have p-values less than 0.001 and t-statistics comparable to 
even the expected information release (ExpInfo) variable. The magnitudes of the 
illiquidity coefficients are also comparable to the strongest predictors of information 
release, such as expected information release (ExpInfo) and the two event timing 
                                                 
37 ExpInfo is defined as (100 – Price) * Price, which is the expected value of squared returns to expiration 
under the assumption of market efficiency. InEvent is a dummy variable indicating whether the securities’ 
price has moved by five points or more during the expiration day. LnTime is the logarithm of one plus the 
number of hours elapsed since the first time the security was recorded. LnMoves is the logarithm of one 
plus the number of five-point or more price movements since initial listing. LnAbsRet is the logarithm of 
one plus the absolute value of returns over the prior 30-minute period. LnVolHr is the logarithm of one plus 
hourly volume, extrapolated from the preceding 30-minute period. In robustness checks, I find that the 
liquidity coefficient estimates are not particularly sensitive to the use of alternative sets of control variables. 
38 I do not include regressions from months with fewer than 200 observations. Including all months and 
attributing greater weights to months with more observations produces smaller standard errors. Performing 
pooled OLS estimates also produces smaller standard errors.   28
variables (LnTime and LnMoves).
39 These results suggest that liquidity could proxy for 
non-informational or noise trading, as it does in Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985). In the 30 minutes following liquidity measurement, the prices of liquid securities 
converge much more slowly toward their terminal cash flows. 
To show how this convergence takes place over longer time periods, Figure 5 
presents the cumulative reductions in mean squared error for liquid and illiquid securities 
in the ten data recording periods surrounding the time of liquidity measurement. For ease 
of interpretation, the figure also depicts the difference between the information release 
during a liquidity event and an illiquidity event. To reduce the impact of event timing on 
the analysis, I include only observations that occur after the underlying sports or financial 
event has begun, as defined by the InEvent dummy variable described earlier.
40 
[Insert Figure 5 around here.] 
As expected, the prices of both liquid and illiquid securities monotonically 
converge toward fundamentals as time passes. However, this convergence does not take 
place at the same rate. In the two hours after an illiquidity event, prices incorporate 
information much faster than they do after a liquidity event. This result holds for both 
sports and financial securities. A notable aspect of Figure 5 is that liquidity events tend to 
follow periods in which prices incorporate a lot of information, whereas illiquidity events 
precede these informative periods. A simple interpretation is that informed trading 
precedes informative events, which subsequently attract the interest of noise traders. In 
                                                 
39 To interpret the coefficient magnitudes, I standardize each coefficient using each independent variable’s 
full-sample standard deviation. For example, a one-standard-deviation change in LnSpread would predict 
the movement of a security priced at 89.7 to its eventual expiration value of 100—i.e., (100 – 89.7)
2 = 
106.3 squared percentage points is the coefficient magnitude. 
40 I find similar results comparing information release in liquid and illiquid securities before the underlying 
event has begun. The only qualitative difference is that prices incorporate almost no information prior to 
the liquidity or illiquidity events that occur before the event has begun.   29
summary, Table VII and Figure 5 provide strong statistical and visual support for the 




Using data from conventional financial markets to uncover the complex 
relationships between liquidity and market efficiency is a daunting task. Rather than 
confront this task directly, I conduct tests of absolute pricing efficiency using 
TradeSports data on simple short-horizon securities with observable fundamentals and 
negligible exposure to systematic risk. The hope is that identifying empirical regularities 
in these simple sports and financial securities can inform future theoretical and empirical 
studies of more complex environments. 
In this setting, tests of market efficiency consistently reject theoretical models in 
which liquidity either does not affect or enhances informational efficiency. In particular, 
securities markets with persistently high liquidity show significant pricing anomalies, 
such as overpricing low probability events and underpricing high probability events. 
These pricing patterns correspond closely to the predictions of Kahneman and Tversky’s 
(1979) probability weighting function, suggesting that their theory applies to noise 
traders, who dominate pricing in persistently liquid markets. Conversely, the sporadically 
liquid and illiquid securities markets are remarkably efficient. A leading explanation is 
that illiquid markets have fewer noise traders, and periods of illiquidity prevent 
arbitrageurs from profiting on short-term trades that would destabilize prices.   30
Additional statistical tests provide support for the idea that liquidity serves as a 
proxy for non-informational or noise trading. The key finding is that the prices of illiquid 
securities converge toward terminal cash flows much more rapidly than the prices of 
liquid securities. This implies that non-informational or noise trading is prevalent during 
periods of liquidity, which may help explain the observed mispricing in liquid securities. 
Although these results are unlikely to generalize without modification to 
conventional financial markets with long-horizon securities and larger stakes, they do 
suggest three interesting directions for future research. First, liquidity may only appear to 
be a priced risk factor because it captures some systematic element of mispricing. 
Second, different types and sources of liquidity may have opposing effects on the costs of 
arbitrage and equilibrium mispricing—e.g., liquidity from noise trading may harm 
efficiency, whereas liquidity from low search costs may enhance efficiency. Third, 
because there appear to be significant limits to arbitrage on an online exchange with few 
capital constraints and securities that expire within a single day, the limits to arbitrage in 
conventional markets may be more severe than previously thought.   31
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Table I: Returns to Expiration for Sports and Financial Securities 
 
This table reports the results from three ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
securities’ returns to expiration on five dummy variables, Price1 through Price5. The 
three regressions include observations of the returns and prices of securities based on 
one-day sports, financial, and both types of events recorded at 30-minute intervals in 
which there is active trading (see text for details). I compute returns to expiration as the 
payoff at expiration, 0 or 100 points, minus the bid-ask midpoint divided by 100 points. I 
construct dummy variables (Price1 through Price5) for five equally-spaced pricing 
intervals: (0,20), [20,40), [40,60), [60,80), and [80,100) points. The small probabilities 
row displays the magnitude and significance of the average coefficient on Price1 and 
Price2. The large probabilities row displays the magnitude and significance of the 
average coefficient on Price3, Price4, and Price5. The large minus small row reports the 
magnitude and significance of the difference in these two averages. I compute clustered 
standard errors to account for correlations within and across securities that expire on the 
same calendar day (Froot (1989)). 
 
 Sports  Financial  Both  Types 
0 < Price < 20  -1.45**  -0.45  -0.63 
  (0.69) (0.65) (0.55) 
20 ≤ Price < 40  -1.95  -0.29  -1.04 
  (1.60) (1.15) (0.96) 
40 ≤ Price < 60  -0.76  2.81**  -0.47 
  (0.67) (1.42) (0.63) 
60 ≤ Price < 80  1.10  2.82**  1.41 
  (1.06) (1.40) (0.90) 
80 ≤ Price < 100  1.90**  1.20  1.63*** 
  (0.89) (0.84) (0.62) 
Small Probabilities  -1.70*  -0.37  -0.83 
  (0.91) (0.80) (0.64) 
Large Probabilities  0.75  2.28**  0.86* 
  (0.61) (1.01) (0.51) 
Large – Small  2.45**  2.65***  1.69** 
  (1.01) (1.03) (0.76) 
R-squared  0.0005 0.0019 0.0004 
Expiration  Days  1109 776 1123 
Observations 132583 41798 174381 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   35
Table II: Returns to Expiration for Sports and Financial Securities Sorted by Bid-Ask Spread 
This table reports the results from nine (3x3) ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of securities’ returns to expiration on five 
dummy variables, Price1 through Price5 (see text or Table I for details). The nine regressions include three sets of regressions for 
securities based on one-day sports, financial and all events. Each set includes regressions for high bid-ask spread, low bid-ask spread, 
and both groups of securities (the Low – High columns). See text for further details. 



















0 < Price < 20  -0.22  -3.46***  -3.24***  -0.34 -0.68 -0.34  -0.33  -1.98***  -1.66* 
 (0.85)  (0.89)  (1.13)  (0.68)  (1.09) (1.10)  (0.61) (0.75) (0.85) 
20 ≤ Price < 40  -0.82  -3.46  -2.65  0.00 -3.86*  -3.86* -0.27 -3.52 -3.25 
 (1.47)  (2.67)  (2.64)  (1.15)  (2.33) (2.12)  (0.92) (2.32) (2.31) 
40 ≤ Price < 60  -1.19*  -0.46  0.73  2.53*  5.46*  2.93  -0.54  -0.39  0.15 
 (0.61)  (0.87)  (0.77)  (1.42)  (2.90) (2.57)  (0.56) (0.86) (0.78) 
60 ≤ Price < 80  0.27  1.84  1.57  2.43*  6.11***  3.69*  1.00  1.96  0.97 
 (1.07)  (1.29)  (1.12)  (1.43)  (2.36) (2.14)  (0.86) (1.25) (1.15) 
80 ≤ Price < 100  1.61*  2.04  0.43  1.35  -0.04  -1.38  1.48**  1.66  0.18 
 (0.85)  (1.38)  (1.34)  (0.84) (1.30) (1.06)  (0.59) (1.14) (1.10) 
Small Probabilities  -0.52  -3.46**  -2.94***  -0.17 -2.27*  -2.10*  -0.30 -2.75**  -2.45** 
 (0.87)  (1.43)  (1.43)  (0.82) (1.37) (1.26)  (0.66) (1.23) (1.26) 
Large Probabilities  0.23  1.14  0.91  2.10** 3.85**  1.74  0.64 1.07 0.43 
 (0.57)  (0.80)  (0.66)  (1.01) (1.57) (1.26)  (0.48) (0.74) (0.65) 
Large – Small  0.75  4.60***  3.85**  2.27** 6.11*** 3.84**  0.94 3.83***  2.88** 
 (0.93)  (1.33)  (1.60)  (1.05) (1.88) (1.73)  (0.73) (1.41) (1.39) 
R-squared  0.0005  0.0008 0.0007  0.0015 0.0094 0.0021  0.0003 0.0008 0.0005 
Expiration  Days 1088  1067 1094  764  636  765  1105 1085 1108 
Observations 55174  75279  130453  37764  3699  41463  92938  78978  171916 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   36
Table III: Returns to Expiration for Different Securities Sorted by Price Impact 
 
This table reports the results from nine (3x3) ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of securities’ returns to expiration on five 
dummy variables, Price1 through Price5 (see text or Table I for details). The nine regressions include three sets of regressions for 
securities based on one-day sports, financial and all events. Each set includes regressions for high post-trade price movement (High 
Impact), low post-trade price movement (Low Impact), and both groups of securities (Low – High). See text for further details. 
 



















0 < Price < 20  0.03  -3.72***  -3.74***  -0.28 -0.79 -0.52  -0.24  -1.74***  -1.50*** 
 (0.92)  (0.82)  (1.16)  (0.66)  (0.83) (0.64)  (0.59) (0.63)  (0.58) 
20 ≤ Price < 40  -0.38  -3.98  -3.59  -0.25 -0.02 0.22  -0.30 -2.82  -2.52 
 (1.33)  (2.55)  (2.28)  (1.16)  (1.71) (1.42)  (0.89) (1.88)  (1.76) 
40 ≤ Price < 60  -0.99*  -0.55  0.44  2.17  5.95***  3.78**  -0.53  -0.40  0.13 
 (0.58)  (0.90)  (0.75)  (1.42)  (2.09) (1.67)  (0.54) (0.88)  (0.75) 
60 ≤ Price < 80  0.76  1.56  0.80  2.21  5.34***  3.14**  1.19  1.79  0.60 
 (0.95)  (1.39)  (1.15)  (1.45)  (1.85) (1.58)  (0.79) (1.31)  (1.15) 
80 ≤ Price < 100  1.08  2.67**  1.59  0.78  2.39***  1.61**  0.93  2.60***  1.67* 
 (0.88)  (1.29)  (1.24)  (0.92) (0.81) (0.75)  (0.63) (0.99)  (0.97) 
Small Probabilities  -0.18  -3.85***  -3.67***  -0.26 -0.41 -0.15  -0.27 -2.28**  -2.01** 
 (0.84)  (1.33)  (1.19)  (0.81) (1.04) (0.78)  (0.64) (1.02)  (0.94) 
Large Probabilities  0.28  1.22  0.94  1.72* 4.56***  2.84***  0.53 1.33*  0.80 
 (0.53)  (0.82)  (0.65)  (1.04) (1.14) (0.82)  (0.46) (0.73)  (0.63) 
Large – Small  0.46  5.07***  4.61***  1.98* 4.97***  2.98***  0.80 3.61***  2.81*** 
 (0.90)  (1.49)  (1.34)  (1.06) (1.36) (1.08)  (0.71) (1.20)  (1.07) 
R-squared  0.0004  0.0009  0.0007 0.0011 0.0080 0.0022  0.0002 0.0008  0.0005 
Expiration Days  1087  1066  1094  761  721  765  1105  1092  1108 
Observations 60368  70085  130453  34321  7142  41463  94689  77227  171916 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   37
Table IV: Returns to Expiration for Securities Sorted by Liquidity and Controls 
This table reports the results from three ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
securities’ returns to expiration on five dummy variables, Price1 through Price5, and six 
sets of interaction terms with these five dummies (see text for details). The table displays 
only the coefficients from the set of five liquidity interaction terms. The three regressions 
use three different liquidity measures as the basis for these five interaction terms (see text 
for construction). All regressions also include four sets of five control interaction terms 
based on return volatility, trading volume, order imbalance, and time horizon. I report the 
p-values for these 20 interaction terms below. Because each regression includes all 
securities based on one-day sports and financial events, I include a sixth set of five 
interactions to allow for variation in mispricing across sports and financial securities. 
 






(0 < P < 20) * Liquid  -2.47**  -1.40  -1.20** 
  (0.97) (0.89) (0.59) 
(20 ≤ P < 40) * Liquid  -4.17*  -3.48*  -2.90** 
  (2.46) (2.06) (1.44) 
(40 ≤ P < 60) * Liquid  0.48  0.75  0.49 
  (0.75) (0.71) (0.67) 
(60 ≤ P < 80) * Liquid  0.03  1.09  0.31 
  (1.12) (1.05) (1.00) 
(80 ≤ P < 100) * Liquid  0.99  -0.09  1.77** 
  (1.20) (1.00) (0.88) 
Small  Probabilities  -3.32*** -2.44** -2.05*** 
  (1.30) (1.12) (0.76) 
Large Probabilities  0.50  0.59  0.86* 
  (0.61) (0.55) (0.52) 
Large – Small  3.82***  3.03**  2.90*** 
  (1.45) (1.27) (0.90) 
P-value for 20 Controls  0.1685  0.1683  0.1554 
R-squared  0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 
Expiration  Days  1101 1101 1101 
Observations  159361 159361 159361 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   38
Table V: Returns to Expiration for Liquid Securities Sorted by Liquidity 
Persistence and Trading Volume 
 
This table reports the results from six ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
securities’ returns to expiration on five dummy variables, Price1 through Price5 (see text 
or Table I for details). All included securities are based on one-day sports and financial 
events, and have above-median liquidity based on both bid-ask spreads and post-trade 
price movement.  The regressions in Columns One, Two, and Three include securities 
with sporadically high liquidity, persistently high liquidity and both groups of securities, 
respectively. I classify securities with high liquidity in three consecutive data recording 
periods (over one hour) as persistently liquid. The regressions in Columns One and Two 
estimate mispricing for sporadically and persistently liquid securities in each of the five 
pricing categories. The regression in Column Three, which includes both groups of 
securities, uses five interaction terms to estimate the difference in mispricing between 
persistently and sporadically liquid securities in the five pricing categories. The 
regressions in Columns Four, Five, and Six perform analogous tests to assess whether 
mispricing in liquid securities depends on trading volume. I classify all securities with 
above-median volume as high volume securities. 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 













0 < Price < 20  -1.73**  -7.30***  -5.57***  -4.22***  -2.71***  1.51 
 (0.82)  (0.78)  (0.94)  (1.46)  (0.78)  (1.35) 
20 ≤ Price < 40  -1.82  -8.39  -6.57  0.47  -8.89***  -9.36***
 (1.92)  (5.43)  (4.67)  (3.03)  (3.44)  (3.36) 
40 ≤ Price < 60  -0.46  -0.38  0.08  -0.53  -0.31  0.22 
 (0.71)  (1.52)  (1.20)  (0.79)  (1.51)  (1.35) 
60 ≤ Price < 80  1.57  1.78  0.22  1.03  2.43  1.40 
 (1.08)  (2.17)  (1.67)  (1.34)  (2.21)  (2.10) 
80 ≤ Price < 100  1.32  3.93  2.61  1.02  2.83**  1.81 
 (0.92)  (2.60)  (2.32)  (2.20) (1.38) (2.13) 
Small Probabilities  -1.78*  -7.84***  -6.07***  -1.88 -5.80***  -3.92** 
 (1.06)  (2.69)  (2.29)  (1.66) (1.77) (1.77) 
Large Probabilities  0.81  1.78  0.97  0.51 1.65 1.14 
 (0.60)  (1.38)  (1.09)  (0.95) (1.17) (1.11) 
Large – Small  2.59**  9.62***  7.04***  2.38 7.45***  5.06** 
 (1.16)  (3.02)  (2.55)  (1.89) (2.09) (2.08) 
R-squared 0.0004  0.0020  0.0011  0.0003  0.0025  0.0013 
Expiration Days  1059  857  1059  1028  1000  1059 
Observations 33684  26344  60028  30518  29510  60028   39
Table VI: Realizable Returns to Expiration for Liquid Securities 
 
This table reports the results from six ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
securities’ returns to expiration on five dummy variables, Price1 through Price5. The 
regressions and results are similar to Table I with two exceptions. First, this table 
includes only the liquid securities—i.e., those with below-median bid-ask spreads and 
below-median post-trade price movement. Second, the dependent variable is now 
realizable returns to expiration rather than returns to expiration. This means that there are 
two separate regressions for the buyer’s and the seller’s realizable returns to expiration in 
this table corresponding to each regression in Table I. I assume that the buyer pays the 
inside ask price, the seller receives the inside bid price in the computation of realizable 
returns to expiration, and both buyers and sellers must pay 0.8%, the round-trip 
commission for a market order on the TradeSports exchange. See text for further details. 
 
 Sports  Financial    Both Types 
 Buyer  Seller  Buyer Seller    Buyer Seller 
0 < Price < 20  -5.80***  3.42***  -2.10  -0.54    -4.29***  1.80** 
 (0.82)  (0.84)  (1.36)  (1.37)    (0.79)  (0.81) 
20 ≤ Price < 40  -5.49*  2.94  -4.33  1.59    -5.42*  2.86 
 (3.06)  (3.06)  (4.06)  (4.05)    (2.88)  (2.89) 
40 ≤ Price < 60  -1.75*  -0.76  10.17**  -12.92***    -1.68*  -0.83 
 (0.98)  (0.98)  (3.99)  (4.00)    (0.98)  (0.98) 
60 ≤ Price < 80  0.30  -2.81*  9.38***  -12.13***    0.42  -2.92** 
 (1.48)  (1.48)  (3.31)  (3.31)    (1.46)  (1.46) 
80 ≤ Price < 100  1.24  -3.69**  -0.08  -2.54**    1.06  -3.54*** 
 (1.55)  (1.55)  (1.02)  (1.02)    (1.35)  (1.35) 
Small Probabilities  -5.64***  3.18**  -3.22 0.52   -4.85*** 2.33 
 (1.59)  (1.59)  (2.29) (2.29)    (1.50) (1.50) 
Large Probabilities  -0.07  -2.42***  6.49*** -9.20***    -0.07 -2.43*** 
 (0.90)  (0.90)  (1.92) (1.92)    (0.85) (0.85) 
Large – Small  5.57***  -5.60***  9.71*** -9.72***    4.79*** -4.76*** 
 (1.79)  (1.79)  (2.90) (2.90)    (1.70) (1.70) 
R-squared 0.0017  0.0014  0.0279 0.0416    0.0016 0.0015 
Expiration Days  1040  1040  524 524    1059 1059 
Observations 58425  58425  1603 1603    60028 60028 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table VII: Predicting How Much Information Prices Incorporate Using Liquidity 
 
This table reports the results from two ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of the 
reduction in squared percentage returns to expiration on liquidity and several control 
variables. I compute the reduction in squared returns over the roughly 30-minute data 
recording period that follows liquidity and control variable measurement. The key 
independent variables in the two regressions are the two liquidity measures: logarithms of 
bid-ask spreads (LnSpread) and post-trade price movement (LnImpact). Each regression 
also includes control variables for expected information release through expiration 
(ExpInfo), whether the event is in progress (InEvent), two measures for the time elapsed 
since initial security listing (LnTime and LnMoves), and the trading volume (LnVolHr) 
and volatility (LnAbsRet) during the prior period (see text for details). All regressions 
include time dummy variables for each data recording period. I compute the coefficients 
and standard errors from the averages and standard deviations of the coefficients in 
monthly cross-sectional regressions (Fama and MacBeth (1973)). The standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation up to three lags in the time series of the 
coefficients (Newey and West (1987)). 
 
Dependent Variable  Reduction in Squared 
% Returns to Expiration 
LnSpread  106.3***  
 (11.9)   
LnImpact   55.7*** 
   (6.9) 
ExpInfo  112.6*** 110.0*** 
 (10.8)  (11.2) 
InEvent  -10.3 -6.2 
 (8.8)  (8.6) 
LnTime  -51.8*** -61.7*** 
 (10.7)  (10.4) 
LnMoves  61.7*** 64.3*** 
 (19.7)  (20.3) 
LnVolHr  -5.9 -6.9 
 (9.7)  (10.2) 
LnAbsRet  36.5** 48.9*** 
 (17.8)  (17.3) 
Monthly Regressions  41  41 
Total Expiration Days  1109  1109 
Total Observations  160855  160855 
Average R-squared  0.0443  0.0392 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1: The S-shaped Mispricing Pattern in Sports and Financial Securities 
This figure depicts the estimated returns to expiration of securities based on various one-
day events for five equally-spaced pricing categories. The three series in the figure depict 
the returns of securities based on sports events, financial events, and both types of events. 
Thus, the figure plots the three sets of coefficient estimates on the five pricing category 
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Figure 2: The Effect of Liquidity on Returns to Expiration 
This figure depicts the estimated differences between the returns to expiration of 
securities with differing degrees of liquidity as measured by two proxies—bid-ask 
spreads and post-trade price movements—for five equally-spaced pricing categories. I 
plot the four sets of coefficient estimates on the five pricing category interaction terms 
shown in Columns Three and Six of Table II and Table III (see these tables for 
construction). These four sets (2x2) of interaction terms measure the effect of spreads and 
post-trade price movement in sports and financial securities. For spreads, the interaction 
term is equal to the returns to expiration of low spread minus high spread securities. For 
post-trade price movement, the interaction term is equal to the returns to expiration of 
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Figure 3: The Effects of Sporadic and Persistent Liquidity on Mispricing 
This figure depicts the estimated returns to expiration of securities with low liquidity, 
sporadic liquidity, and persistent liquidity for five equally-spaced pricing categories. For 
the three security groupings, I plot the coefficients from three separate regressions of 
returns to expiration on the five pricing category dummies. Columns One and Two in 
Table V show the regression estimates for sporadically and persistently liquid securities. 
The low liquidity estimates come from an analogous regression (see text and tables for 
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Figure 4: Profitability of Trading in Liquid Sports and Financial Securities 
This figure shows the realizable returns to expiration for buyers and sellers of liquid 
sports and financial securities in each of the five pricing categories. Each line represents 
one of the four sets of coefficient estimates for the five pricing category dummies. To 
compute realizable returns, I assume that the buyer pays the inside ask price, the seller 
receives the inside bid price in the computation of realizable returns to expiration, and 
both buyers and sellers must pay 0.8%, the round-trip commission for a market order on 
the TradeSports exchange. The numerical return estimates appear in Columns One 
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Figure 5: How Prices Incorporate Information around Liquidity Events 
The figure visually represents and extends the results in Table VII. I present the 
cumulative reduction in squared percentage returns to expiration for liquid and illiquid 
securities in the ten data recording periods surrounding the time of liquidity 
measurement. The thick lines in the figure depict the difference between the information 
release during a liquidity event and an illiquidity event. I include only observations that 
occur after the underlying sports or financial event has begun, as defined by the InEvent 
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